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Martin P. Wattenberg
THE CHANGINGNATUREOFMASS BELIEF SYSTEMS:
THE RISE OF CONCEPT AND POLICY IDEOLOGUES
ABSTRACT: The proportion of the American electorate that is “constrained” by
ideology has risen dramatically since Philip E. Converse suggested, in the early
s, that ideology is the province of only a small fraction of the mass public. In
part, the rise of ideological voters has been obscured by the tendency of scholars after
Converse to equate them with those who use terms referring to ideological concepts,
such as liberal and conservative, in open-ended interviews. These “concept ideo-
logues,” however, are not the only members of the public whose political opinions
show evidence of ideological constraint. There is also a growing segment of the
public, the “policy ideologues,” who take positions on three or more policy issues
but do not happen to mention ideological concepts. Policy ideologues prove to be as
politically knowledgeable as concept ideologues; their attitudes are nearly as con-
strained across issues and over time; and their policy stances usually “make sense”
as liberal or conservative—not surprisingly, as they are almost as willing as concept
ideologues to label themselves ideologically, when asked. By , the portion of
the public consisting of concept and policy ideologues had reached  percent. It
declined to  percent in , but was still a far cry from the  percent of the electorate
whom Converse identiﬁed as ideologues or near ideologues as of .
Keywords: belief systems; concept ideologues; policy ideologues; levels of conceptualization; political
sophistication; Philip E. Converse
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The nature of mass belief systems has changed dramatically since ,
which is the last time a survey of the U.S. mass public was coded by
the “levels of conceptualization” devised by Philip E. Converse in one
of the chapters he contributed to The American Voter (Campbell et al.
). I will show that the percentage of the public that can be categorized
as adhering to the “belief systems” Converse explored there, and in his
seminal  paper on “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”
(Converse [] ), has increased substantially since then. I will also
introduce a new category, “policy ideologues,” to reﬂect a type of
citizen to which Converse referred only in passing, but which is now
quite common. Unlike most of the citizens whomConverse called “ideo-
logues” or “near ideologues,” whom I relabel concept ideologues, policy
ideologues do not mention overarching concepts such as liberalism, con-
servatism, or the scope of government in the open-ended interviews con-
ducted by the American National Election Survey (ANES), on which
Converse drew. Rather, policy ideologues take at least three public-
policy stands when asked what they like and dislike about the major
parties and presidential candidates. Although it was very rare for citizens
in the s to show evidence of holding a clear belief system—Converse
analyzed ANES respondents during the presidential campaign of —
today’s highly intense and polarized policy debates seem to have made this
much more common. A close examination of policy ideologues will show
that they are just as politically knowledgeable and consistent on issue
dimensions as those who employ ideological terms; that they usually
identify themselves as liberals or conservatives, even though their inter-
view transcripts fail to evince ideological terms; and that their policy
views are consistent with this self-identiﬁcation.
The “levels of conceptualization” were introduced in Chapter  of
The American Voter, which was based on Converse’s reading of what
 ANES respondents said when asked what they liked and disliked
about the Democrats, Republicans, Stevenson, and Eisenhower. In
writing this chapter, “The Formation of Issue Concepts and Partisan
Change”—upon which he elaborated in “The Nature of Belief Systems
in Mass Publics”—Converse left an excellent roadmap for future replica-
tions by providing a set of examples of each of the levels and sub-levels
that he created: “ideologues” (Level A in The American Voter; Level I in
“The Nature of Belief Systems”); “near ideologues” (Level B; Level II);
“group interest” voters (Level C; Level III); “nature-of-the-times”
voters (Level D; Level IV); and voters whose comments contained “no
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issue content” (Level E; Level V) (Campbell et al. , Table .; Con-
verse [] , Table ). Each exempliﬁcation of a level consisted of a
verbatim transcript of what a respondent said. Converse grouped various
examples together to explain his coding decisions.
In the many years since the publication of The American Voter and “The
Nature of Belief Systems,” scholars writing about “ideologues” in Con-
verse’s sense have typically combined “ideologues” and “near ideolo-
gues.” The distinction is a ﬁne one, with “ideologues” showing signs
that they understand commonly accepted meanings of liberal and conser-
vative belief systems, while near-ideologues merely make some reference
to liberalism or conservatism or to one of the closely associated concepts
(e.g., “I don’t like big government”). In reviewing the available data from
- and , I found that separate codings for ideologues and near
ideologues existed for only one election, as coders typically combined the
two categories. My own preliminary review of the  interviews led
me to conclude that the two categories were difﬁcult to differentiate,
requiring too many judgment calls, which may explain why earlier
coders combined them. Therefore, I decided to follow their practice.
Thus, when I write about “concept ideologues” in this paper I am refer-
ring to respondents that Converse coded as either ideologues or near
ideologues.
However, I will exclude one portion of Converse’s near ideologues
from the category of “concept ideologues”: those whose open-ended
remarks focused on a set of policy issues. The original  coding
scheme, as documented by John C. Pierce (), shows a sub-category
of near ideologues labeled as having “Rich Speciﬁc Issue Content,”
which was explained as having “differentiated structure without explicit
ideological reference” (Pierce , -). Although Converse’s
coding of this sub-category has been lost, it is doubtful that it was a
very large contingent in . In recent years, however, such policy-
oriented respondents have become quite numerous. As explained
shortly, I label this group “policy ideologues.”
As we shall see, substantial increases in both concept and policy ideo-
logues since the s account for virtually all of the increase in the pro-
portion of ANES respondents whose partisanship matches their ideology
(conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats). Not only are both
concept ideologues and policy ideologues more numerous than they
used to be, but their higher degree of ideological constraint has produced
a marked rise in the overall correspondence between partisanship and
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ideology. On the other hand, the decline in ideologically inconsistent par-
tisans (liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats) has occurred
across the board. Thus, party polarization at the mass level appears to
stem from changes among those constrained by belief systems, which
increase ideological/partisan consistency; and from partisan sorting,
which diminishes the number of partisans who are out of step with
their party’s ideological stance.
Reconceptualizing the Levels of Conceptualization
As I started to code  respondents’ comments by level of conceptual-
ization, I found myself frequently writing “clear belief system; no ideo-
logical concepts” in the margin of the transcripts. In such cases, the
respondent would discuss numerous speciﬁc policies, but without men-
tioning any overarching terms such as “liberalism” or “conservatism,”
or ideologically charged concepts such as the degree of federal involve-
ment in the economy.
Initially I simply coded these respondents as “ideologues.” Converse,
after all, had indicated that in addition to expressing abstract thinking, a
respondent qualiﬁed as an ideologue by showing indirect evidence of
an overarching belief system that would link her evaluations of parties
and/or candidates to the parties’ or candidates’ issue positions. As Con-
verse said in The American Voter, some respondents “had highly differen-
tiated images relevant to one or another ideological content domain, yet
failed to introduce the generalized concepts that are normally used to
summarize and order these perceptions in sophisticated debate” (Camp-
bell et al. , ). He invoked a respondent who remarked that the
Democrats were for higher Social Security/old age pensions and better
conditions for workers, whereas the Republicans opted not to take
action to end the Great Depression.
Based on my own recollections from reading the microﬁlmed 
interviews many years ago, I believe that the policy-oriented pattern
exempliﬁed by this respondent was relatively rare in the era when Con-
verse developed the levels of conceptualization. However, it quickly
became apparent that this pattern was very common in more recent
ANES interviews. After writing “clear belief system; no ideological con-
cepts” in the margins of about  percent of the ﬁrst  transcripts I
coded, I created a sub-category to keep track of this pattern. I also realized
that I needed to develop a clear standard for slotting people into this sub-
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category. In my judgment, someone who mentioned one or two policy
issues typically seemed to be oriented around how his or her favored
group would be helped or hurt by the policies. In contrast, once
someone mentioned three distinct policy issues, they were usually
putting together the building blocks of a platform for governing. For
example, someone who said she liked Trump because he would increase
military spending and reduce immigration and disliked Clinton because
she would increase taxes expressed a clear grasp of some of the most fun-
damental policy positions debated in the  campaign.
A set of examples from the , , and  ANES surveys will
provide a brief overview of the sorts of responses that were made by
people whom I coded as policy ideologues. The ﬁrst example (R)
is a woman in her s, interviewed in , who had a college degree
and worked as a registered nurse:
Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican Party? I do like
some of their policies about military spending, handling the Middle East,
um, and handling China, trades [sic] with other countries.
Is there anything in particular that you don’t like about the Republican Party? I
don’t like that they’re against gay marriage; against abortion; their views
on health care.
Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic Party? I agree
with a lot of their policies, healthcare for everyone, let’s see what else. I
like their views on gay marriage, abortion, and the tax on the wealthy.
Is there anything in particular that you don’t like about the Democratic Party? I
don’t particularly like the issue on military spending and I don’t particularly
like, let’s see, some of the issues with you know the Middle East. How
we’re handling refugees coming in. Um . . . trading with China.
Is there anything in particular about Donald Trump that might make you want to vote
for him?There’s some of his policies that I’mokwith—maybe  or  policies.
Is there anything in particular about Donald Trump that might make you want to
vote against him? Lack of experience; I don’t agree with a lot of his policies;
he’s just too hot headed; I don’t trust him; I think he’s been running a
negative campaign.
Is there anything in particular about Hillary Clinton that might make you want to
vote for her? Gender; experience; her policies.
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Is there anything in particular about Hillary Clinton that might make you want to
vote against her? Her email incident, the trusting issue; I’m not  percent
for all her policies.
This respondent was clearly very focused on multiple questions of
public policy, but also conﬂicted, with some of her views favoring the
Democrats and others favoring the Republicans. Reﬂecting her mixture
of liberal and conservative views, she placed herself as a “moderate” ()
on the -point ideology scale in both her pre- and post-election inter-
views, and right in the middle () of the - left/right scale, equidistant
from her placement of each party on the same scale. However, even
though this woman did not use any ideological terms, and even though
her policy views did not seem to be dictated by either liberalism or con-
servatism, something determined her policy stances. Furthermore, her
stances on the issues were not in any way contradictory, as Converse
said was often the case with respondents at lower levels of conceptualiz-
ation, who typically had inconsistent (and unstable) attitudes. Hence this
respondent is a good example of someone who seems to have what Con-
verse ([] , ) called an “idiosyncratic” (neither liberal nor con-
servative) belief system. She apparently knew what both liberals and
conservatives stood for and quite rightly realized that she was not
solidly in line with either one. Calling herself a “moderate” makes
perfect sense and sums up her apparent belief system.
The second example (R) comes from a man in his s, inter-
viewed in , who had a college degree and worked as an administrator
in a nursing home:
Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican Party? A few key
points—I like their views on defense of the US, their economic policies,
creating jobs, and building the economy.
Is there anything in particular that you don’t like about the Republican Party?
Their views on abortion. This goes for both the parties—the uncoopera-
tiveness with working with the other party.
Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic Party? No.
Is there anything in particular that you don’t like about the Democratic Party? Their
tax policies, health care reform, and stimulus spending. Wanting to increase
taxes on the rich; I don’t agree; I believe the rich already pay their own
share.
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Is there anything in particular about Mitt Romney that might make you want to vote
for him? Economic policy. His plan to create jobs and get rid of Obamacare.
Is there anything in particular about Mitt Romney that might make you want to vote
against him? There are things I don’t like but not so bad to vote against him.
I don’t agree with his belief on right to life.
Is there anything in particular about Barack Obama that might make you want to
vote for him? No.
Is there anything in particular about Barack Obama that might make you want to
vote against him? Obamacare, foreign policy, economic policy, amount of
debt the government has incurred. I don’t like his statement he made to
the Russian president how he would be able to help him after the election
is over. The protection of U.S. citizens overseas; also, allowing countries to
develop nuclear weapons in theMiddle East. Not showing enough support
for Israel. Reducing the United States nuclear arsenal while other countries
have not.
As to be expected from the negative evaluations expressed here about
the policies of the Obama administration and the Democratic Party, this
respondent said he was a conservative in both the pre- and post-election
interviews. On the - left-right scale, he placed himself at  while
placing the Republicans at  and the Democrats at . The one-point
difference between his views and his perception of the Republicans
perhaps reﬂects his difference with the GOP on abortion. Yet while
this respondent clearly was a conservative, he made no mention of ideo-
logical concepts in the open-ended responses.
Our third example (R) is from a  interview with a man in his
s who had some college education and reported being permanently
disabled:
Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican Party?There seems
to be an infusion [sic] ofwheneverwe elect aRepublican president of perhaps
—things are going to get good, unrealistic feeling,we are always disappointed.
Is there anything in particular that you don’t like about the Republican Party? They
seem to always put us in a hole, economically, our relationship with other
countries, with the world in general, we seem to come out looking
forward/look how the nations, either the Islamic or Muslim world look
at us now for our involvement in the Middle East, look at our lack of inter-
est in the genocide in Africa, Rwanda—we didn’t do a damn thing.
Wattenberg • Concept and Policy Ideologues 
Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic Party? They’re
more realistic at where we stand in relationship to the world community,
all the problems in there, they take a more realistic approach to things, they
have a more humanistic approach and feeling for the world problems—
health, economic/usually the subcommittees, congressional and Senate
try to subsidize certain programs so they might continue so the US can
be looked on as a benevolent nation—the peace corps, international
food program.
Is there anything in particular that you don’t like about the Democratic Party? They
always let us down. They can’t seem to ﬁnish what they start. They back
down on vital important issues where they will concede—various commit-
tees—you get like a case of glass half full–it’s actually half empty–I’ve been
disappointed with their performance.
Is there anything in particular about John McCain that might make you want to vote
for him? No.
Is there anything in particular about John McCain that might make you want to vote
against him?His age, his voting record, his ideology on foreign policy, as far
he seems to be in the main Republican change of thought camp so far as
dealing with oil policies, intrusive actions, involving other countries, he’s
really so similar to Bush. And look at the mess we are in now—it hasn’t
worked and it isn’t working. It’s like where his priorities are where
money should go, like education vs. oil interests, stuff like that, priorities
are screwed.
Is there anything in particular about Barack Obama that might make you want to
vote for him? I’m just hoping his age and his outlook on policy—he’s not, he
seems fresher, fresher ideas, maybe a different approach on a lot of our
policy. Financially, I hate to say it, but when you really read the platform,
unfortunately it’s still the party platform—there really is nothing new—
income tax incentives, it’s been done, you could almost say I would
have voted for Clinton, but since she’s not in the race I’m picking the
lesser of two evils.
Is there anything in particular about Barack Obama that might make you want to
vote against him? No.
Although this respondent mentions the term “ideology,” he discusses
not broad ideological concepts but a wide range of policies and programs.
The level of detail in his policy comments is impressive, including men-
tions of congressional committees and the Democratic Party platform.
And his closed-ended responses explain his rather liberal outlook on
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speciﬁc policies. In the pre-election interview he placed himself at the
slightly liberal  notch on the -point ideology scale, and in the post-elec-
tion interview he moved himself to the liberal notch of . On the -
left-right scale, he placed himself at , while placing the Democrats 
points to the right, at , and the Republicans at the most right-wing
point, .
These three examples illustrate how respondents who use policy pos-
itions as the basis of party and candidate evaluations may possess a belief
system akin to, and sometimes identical with, the belief systems that Con-
verse looked for.
The Rise of Policy Ideologues
Previous attempts to replicate Converse’s measures of the levels of con-
ceptualization do not address respondents who discuss multiple policy
issues but fail to mention ideological terms or concepts (Knight, ;
Lewis-Beck et al., ). Nevertheless, such respondents are discernible
once one carefully examines the master coding of answers to the open-
ended ANES questions asked from  to .
For example, in the  and  ANES surveys, I found  cases
where the respondent had offered at least six policy responses and yet
were coded as either “group beneﬁts” or “nature of the times.” This
amounted to about  percent of the entire sample in each year. This dis-
covery led me to use the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File to
produce a count of the number of speciﬁc policy comments made by
each respondent from  to . I found , cases coded as
“group beneﬁts” or “nature of the times” in which a respondent had
made at least three policy comments. (There were no cases in which
respondents who made three policy comments were classiﬁed as “no
issue content”). I reviewed the coding of each of these cases individually
to see if the respondents had referred to at least three distinct questions of
public policy, as some respondents just mentioned the same one or two
issues repeatedly. This method is less reliable than reading a transcript of
what respondents actually said, as I did with the - surveys.
Some cases were clear as day, but others involved codes that were so
similar that it was hard to judge whether the respondent was just
talking about a single issue in somewhat different terms. In  percent
of the , cases, I judged that the respondent probably should have
been coded as a policy ideologue by virtue of mentioning three distinct
Wattenberg • Concept and Policy Ideologues 
policies. In addition, I changed a small number of cases from “nature of
the times” to “group beneﬁts” because the respondent mentioned a
policy or two that I coded as belonging in the latter category in my
work with the - data.
Two examples will serve to illustrate my recoding process. The ﬁrst
(R) is from a  interview with a man in his s who was a high-
school graduate and worked as a truck driver. (Keep in mind that these
are the codes assigned to the respondents’ comments, not transcriptions
of the actual comments.)
Likes about Republicans: Against government activity; economy better under
them; less concerned with environmental protection; against aid to paro-
chial schools; for strong military.
Dislikes about Republicans: Party is poorly organized/ineffective.
Likes about Democrats: No.
Dislikes about Democrats: General assessment of ideas.
Likes about Bush: For lower taxes; against government activity; for strong
military; for aid to parochial schools; would meddle less in world problems.
Dislikes about Bush: No.
Likes about Gore: No.
Dislikes about Gore: Against lower taxes; overly concerned about environ-
mental protections; too much for government activity.
This respondent was coded as a group-beneﬁts voter, presumably
because of the coder’s interpretation of the reasons he offered for some
of the issue positions that he took. What is relevant here, however, is
that he took positions on a great many policy issues; and that, as might
be expected from his consistently conservative policy views, he placed
himself as an “extreme conservative” on the -point ideology scale.
Thus, he appears to have been misclassiﬁed as a group-beneﬁts voter.
Converse would have coded such a respondent as a near-ideologue in
.
The second example comes from , the year in which policy ideo-
logues ﬁrst seem to have become a signiﬁcant group. Rwas a woman
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in her s who had dropped out of high school and was now a retired
administrative assistant.
Likes about Republicans: General positive assessment of their economic
policy.
Dislikes about Republicans: Their policy on law and order; they provide too
much foreign aid; they are against senior citizens; they oppose reform of tax
loopholes; they oppose the nuclear freeze.
Likes about Democrats: They are for the common man; they take a hard line
on criminals; they are the party of JFK; they are good for the country; they
are pro-education.
Dislikes about Democrats: They are too divided amongst themselves.
Likes about Reagan: No.
Dislikes about Reagan: Don’t like his wife; he’s against the nuclear freeze;
he’s against reform of tax loopholes; he’s against welfare programs; he’s
against abortion.
Likes about Mondale: He’s the lesser of two evils.
Dislikes about Mondale: He is uninspiring; don’t like his running mate.
This respondent opposed many of the policies of the Reagan admin-
istration, and she placed herself at the most liberal point on the -point
ideology scale. Yet she was classiﬁed as a group-beneﬁts voter, probably
because of her view that Republicans were against senior citizens. A
more logical categorization would count her as a policy ideologue. This
recategorization would be justiﬁed by her ideological self-placement,
which we can be fairly certain was not based on a misunderstanding of
the meaning of “liberal.” The ﬁndings of widespread public ignorance
of ideology in The American Voter and “The Nature of Belief Systems”
would lead us to suspect that such misunderstandings may be common-
place, but that is unlikely in this case given the particular policies the
respondent supported and opposed.
As can be seen in Tables  and , the Reagan administration coincided
with a substantial increase in the percentage of policy ideologues. Table 
shows that there were almost none of them in , but that their level
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reached  percent by the end of the Reagan years and that it has gotten
higher since then.
The archived data from the s do not include codes from the
portion of the ANES sample that did not agree to a post-election inter-
view. Hence, in order to make the data comparable from  to
, some subsample of the full ANES sample must be selected.
Because any respondent who reported voting would have been included
in the post-election study, I decided to restrict the analysis in Table  to
voters only. A sub-sample of respondents who voted seemed particularly
appropriate because Converse included an analysis of just voters in both
The American Voter and “Belief Systems.”
Policy ideologues among voters averaged about  percent for the three
elections from  to . Again, one can see that the Reagan Admin-
istration appears to have led to a substantial increase in policy ideologues.
Since the Reagan era, the percentage of policy ideologues among voters
has averaged  percent—roughly six times the level found in the -
 electorates.
Why did this change begin to occur during the Reagan administration?
The most likely answer is that Reagan’s was the ﬁrst presidency since
ANES polling began in  in which a major change in policy direction
was advanced. The coders recorded many expressions of support for and
opposition to Reagan’s attempts to cut taxes, increase military spending,
and reduce welfare spending. Reagan was also outspokenly conservative
Table . Levels of conceptualization among all ANES respondents
      
concept ideologues       
policy ideologues       
concept ideologues plus policy
ideologues
      
group beneﬁts       
nature of the times       
no issue content       
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICPSR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues. : coding of open-ended
responses, obtained from William Jacoby, as recoded by the author for policy
ideologues. -: author’s coding of ANES open-ended responses.
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Table . Levels of conceptualization among ANES respondents who voted
        
concept ideologues         
policy ideologues         
concept ideologues plus policy ideologues         
group beneﬁts         
nature of the times         
no issue content         
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICSPR ) as recoded by the author for policy ideologues. : coding of












on a range of relatively new social issues, such as abortion, gun control,
and environmental protection. These policy matters were frequently on
the minds of policy ideologues in the Reagan era, and have become
even more prominent in the elections since then.
Why weren’t policy ideologues coded as ideologues in previous repli-
cations of Converse’s levels of conceptualization? One can only speculate
about coding decisions made long ago, but as we have already seen, a
speciﬁc focus on ideological concepts may have been at work. Kathleen
Knight did the coding throughout the s, and her primary area of
research interest was the role of ideological concepts in politics (Knight
 and ). The coding of the  survey was done by two graduate
students under the guidance of William Jacoby, whose major ﬁeld of
inquiry was also political ideology (Jacoby  and ). It seems,
accordingly, that only respondents who mentioned ideological terms or
concepts were categorized as either “ideologues” or “near ideologues”
by Jacoby or as “ideologues” by Knight. Both of these investigators
coded my policy ideologues as group-beneﬁts voters if they made any
mention of a group, or nature-of-the-times voters if no group was
mentioned.
Methodologically, what appears to have occurred was a failure by the
coders to attend to the respondents’ remarks holistically. Taken together,
the policy ideologues’ expressions of many ideologically consistent policy
stances suggest that they were just the sort of voters who were scarce in the
 sample: ideologues “constrained” by an overarching belief system,
reﬂecting a coherent set of policy stances.
Political Sophistication and Constraint
Converse’s goal in constructing the levels of conceptualization was to
explore the political “sophistication” of the electorate, with the highest
levels of sophistication equated with having a relatively large quantity
of political knowledge. Converse ([] , -) thought that this
was possible because political knowledge may be organized by a coherent
belief system, i.e., an ideology such as conservatism or liberalism. Lesser
levels of sophistication and knowledge, therefore, would correspond to
simpler and less-comprehensive organizing principles, such as “the
expected favorable or unfavorable treatment of different social groupings
in the population” by a party or candidate (group-beneﬁts) (ibid., ).
The “nature-of-the-times” label (ibid., Table ) was described by
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Converse as being, “to some degree, a residual category, intended to
include those respondents who invoked some policy considerations in
their evaluations yet employed none of the references meriting location
in any of the ﬁrst three levels” (ibid., ). Parties’ or candidates’ perceived
responsibility for having caused nationwide problems, such as “bad [econ-
omic] times,” was one of the main decision criteria, but not the only one,
enunciated by respondents in this category.
The main conclusion that Converse drew from the small numbers of
ideologues and near ideologues was that political analysts, such as journal-
ists and political scientists—who tend to qualify as ideologues themselves
—should not assume that most voters achieve the level of sophistication
that they (the journalists or political scientists) achieve, or imagine that
they achieve, when they use ideological belief systems to understand,
and to formulate opinions about, political candidates and parties. The
fact that, as of , a mere  percent of the electorate qualiﬁed as ideo-
logues or near ideologues (ibid., Table ) suggested to Converse that a
“continental shelf” separated political elites and the masses, to whom
the elites incorrectly attributed their own type of political sophistication
and the correlative belief systems and knowledge levels (ibid., ).
In effect, I am arguing that the rise of policy ideologues in recent years
has narrowed this divide between masses and elites. My holistic impression
of the remarks of the  respondents whom I classiﬁed as policy ideolo-
gues in the , , and  surveys is that they demonstrated a good
grasp of some of the major policy issues addressed in the campaign. Quan-
titatively, they discussed more issues than did concept ideologues: in 
the average policy ideologue offered . issue comments, as compared to
. for concept ideologues, . for group-beneﬁts voters, . for nature-
of-the-times voters, and . for no-issue-content respondents. In addition
to being rather talkative about the issues of the day, policy ideologues
were fairly knowledgeable about and interested in presidential campaigns,
and as we shall see, their policy stances were constrained across issues and
across time, just as we would expect of highly sophisticated voters.
Tables a and b begin to show these patterns by examining respon-
dents’ knowledge levels. For each of the periods in which I personally
coded or recoded responses, I constructed a measure of political knowl-
edge based on the percentage of correct answers to factual questions
about politics (e.g., which party has a majority in the House, the names
of current political leaders, the approximate unemployment rate). The
consistent ﬁnding in Table a is that policy ideologues were only slightly
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less knowledgeable about such facts than concept ideologues, while
group-beneﬁts and nature-of-the-times respondents had a substantially
weaker grasp of basic political facts; no-issue-content respondents had
the least political knowledge. If we follow Converse in assuming that a
belief system may be necessary to organize a large amount of political
information, this ﬁnding, even exclusive of the respondents’ ideological
self-placement, suggests that policy ideologues do indeed have belief
systems. Similar patterns were found with regard to interest in the presi-
dential campaign, as shown in Table b. On a - scale, concept ideo-
logues averaged the highest level of interest at , followed closely by
policy ideologues at , with group-beneﬁts voters at , nature-of-
the-times voters at , and no-issue-content respondents at . This,
Table a. Mean pct. correct on political knowledge questions
-  s
concept ideologues   
policy ideologues   
group beneﬁts   
nature of the times   
no issue content   
Table b. Interest in the presidential campaign
-  s
concept ideologues   
policy ideologues   
group beneﬁts   
nature of the times   
no issue content   
very interested = , somewhat interested = , not much = 
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICPSR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained fromWilliam Jacoby, as recoded
by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset. -:
author’s coding of ANES open-ended responses and merged with ANES datasets.
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too, suggests the presence, among policy ideologues, of political belief
systems that would make politics understandable, rather than remaining
a blooming, buzzing confusion whose signiﬁcance (for those who lack a
belief system) is hard to grasp.
One of Converse’s most celebrated ﬁndings was that the presence of a
coherent belief system is correlated with the stability of political attitudes
over time (Converse [] , -). He arrived at this conclusion in
the course of attempting to determine whether the opinions of those of
his respondents who were not concept ideologues were constrained by
“idiosyncratic” belief systems that conferred on the world of politics as
much meaning in these respondents’minds as liberalism and conservatism
conferred on it in the minds of concept ideologues. He argued,
however, that
if we are indeed involved here in idiosyncratic patterns of belief, each
meaningful to the individual in his own way, then we could expect that
individual responses to the same set of items at different points in time
should show some fundamental stability. They do not. (Ibid., )
To demonstrate this, Converse showed that when respondents were asked
the same “‘basic’ policy questions” at different points in time, “only about
thirteen people out of twenty manage to locate themselves even on the
same side of the controversy in successive interrogations, when ten out
of twenty could have done so by chance alone” (ibid., , ). The
opinions of those who changed sides could not very well have been con-
strained by a belief system of any kind, whether standard or idiosyncratic.
The same strategy would probably be inappropriate in exploring
whether policy ideologues’ opinions manifest belief systems, as it is con-
ceivable that they are simply determined advocates of policy positions that
are unrelated by any ideology, whether standard or idiosyncratic. Thus,
temporal attitude stability among their issue positions could not be
assumed to demonstrate the presence of an overarching belief system.
However, there is a variety of other temporal evidence suggesting that
in most cases policy ideologues have, in fact, established a meaningful pos-
ition on the liberal-conservative continuum in recent years, despite their
failure to use such terminology in the interviews.
Both the pre- and post-election - ANES interviews asked
respondents to place themselves on the - liberal-conservative scale, or
to say that they “haven’t thought about it.” The ﬁrst panel in Table 
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Table . Temporal stability correlations and correlations between measures of ideology
a. Stability correlation (r) of ideological identiﬁcation in pre- and post-interviews
concept ideologues policy ideologues group beneﬁts nature of times no issue content
- combined . . . . .
b. Correlation (r) of ideological placement and liberal/conservative feeling thermometer placements
concept ideologues policy ideologues group beneﬁts nature of times no issue content
- . . . . .
 . . . . .
s . . . . .
c. Correlation (r) of ideological placement and left/right placement
concept ideologues policy ideologues group beneﬁts nature of times no issue content
- . . . . .
d. Correlation (r) of liberal/conservative feeling thermometer placements and left/right placement
concept ideologues policy ideologues group beneﬁts nature of times no issue content
- . . . . -.
Note: “Don’t know” and “Haven’t thought about it” responses are recoded to the midpoint in order to preserve the maximum number of cases.
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICPSR ) as recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained fromWilliam Jacoby, as recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset. -







compares temporal stability coefﬁcients among policy ideologues and
those assigned to the other levels of conceptualization. The stability cor-
relation for policy ideologues is nearly as high as it is for concept ideolo-
gues, while the other categories exhibit far less intertemporal stability in
ideological placement. This suggests that respondents in the other cat-
egories are not as constrained by the ideologies with which they identify
as are concept ideologues and policy ideologues.
In addition to the -point scale, ANES respondents are asked to rate
“liberals” and “conservatives” on a - feeling thermometer. Subtract-
ing a respondent’s rating of liberals from his or her rating of conservatives
yields a scale ranging from - to . If respondents’ attitudes toward
liberals and conservatives stem from their own ideologically motivated
agreement or disagreement with liberals and conservatives, the correlation
between their self-placement on the -point scale and their feeling-ther-
mometer numbers should be highly correlated. As can be seen in the
second panel in Table , this is indeed the case for policy ideologues (as
well as concept ideologues). These correlations show that policy ideolo-
gues were much more ideologically consistent than group-beneﬁts or
nature-of-the-times respondents. Thus, the policy ideologues I identiﬁed
by reading the interviews from - seem to have staked out stable
positions on the ideological continuum, as was the case with the policy
ideologues that I identiﬁed by merely reviewing the coded responses
from the s and .
In recent ANES surveys, people have also been asked to place them-
selves on a - left-right scale. As the terms “left” and “right” are used
less often in the United States than in other established democracies,
even some of the most ideologically aware respondents might be unfami-
liar with these terms. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the correlations
between the left-right scale and the two liberal-conservative scales are
generally lower than the other correlations in Table . Yet the pattern
of concept ideologues and policy ideologues showing far more ideological
consistency than the other levels of conceptualization is again quite clear.
In addition to temporal constraint, Converse associated the intercorre-
lation of people’s political attitudes with the presence of a belief system.
Respondents whose issue positions are constrained by belief systems
should show more intercorrelative consistency than those in lower
levels. In order to examine this possibility, I created three broad issue
indices from the  ANES survey, measuring stances on traditional par-
tisan issues, stances on social issues, and stances on issues speciﬁc to Donald
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Trump’s presidential campaign. Traditional partisan issues consisted of
support for, or opposition to, defense spending, increasing the
minimum wage, taxing millionaires, aid for African-Americans, govern-
ment intervention in health insurance, and government spending in
areas such as health and education. The social issues were abortion, the
death penalty, gun control, marijuana legalization, and same-sex marriage.
The Trump issues were building a wall at the Mexican border, ending
birthright citizenship, deporting unauthorized workers, opposing the
admission of Syrian refugees, limiting foreign imports, opposing free-
trade agreements, and torturing suspected terrorists.
As hypothesized, the correlations displayed in Table  demonstrate that
concept ideologues and policy ideologues possess the most constrained
































. . . . .
ideology and
Trump issues
. . . . .
Sources: Author’s coding of open-ended responses in the  ANES as merged
with the in-person dataset.
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political belief systems. On measures involving traditional partisan and
social issues, there is a linear relationship between attitudinal constraint
and the levels of conceptualization, with policy ideologues evidencing
only slightly less consistency than concept ideologues. However, in all
the cases where Trump issues are included, the correlations are actually
highest for the policy ideologues. If political sophistication is, in part, a
matter of being able to generate assessments of newly raised issues, then
it would seem that policy ideologues are even more sophisticated than
concept ideologues.
In sum, the evidence suggests that policy ideologues represent a politi-
cally engaged group that is comparable in knowledgeability and ideologi-
cal constraint to concept ideologues. Thus, a larger proportion of the
public apparently possessed an overarching political belief system during
the - period than previously realized, and this segment of the
electorate has grown substantially in recent presidential elections.
Policy Ideologues and Higher Education
These ﬁndings are hardly surprising in light of the rise in educational
attainment since . Beginning with Converse’s classic analysis, it has
been well established that those with exposure to higher education are
more likely to evaluate politics ideologically (Converse [] , -
, -, ). Thus, the increase in educational achievement levels
during the period covered in this paper should account for at least some
of the increase in concept ideologues since Reagan was elected president;
and it stands to reason that the same would be true of the increase in policy
ideologues. Between  and , the proportion of the ANES sample
that had not graduated from high school declined from  percent to 
percent while the percentage that had attained a college degree increased
from  percent to  percent. As college-educated respondents were
over seven times as likely to be concept ideologues or policy ideologues
as were those without a high school degree in , the changes in the
educational distribution should have had the effect of increasing
the numbers of concept ideologues and policy ideologues. A simple
reweighting of the  data with  educational levels leads to the
expectation that the percentage of concept ideologues and policy ideolo-
gues, combined, should have gone from  percent to  percent,
accounting for a great deal of the actual increase in their ranks (see
Figure  below).
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Figure  displays the relationship between education and the combined
proportion of policy ideologues and concept ideologues. Within each
educational level, there is evidence of an increase in concept ideologues
and policy ideologues over time. There is also evidence of an increasing
relationship between higher education and the higher levels of conceptu-
alization. The percentage of ideologues and policy ideologues among
those with merely a high-school education or less has always been quite
small and has only budged upwards by a small amount over time. In con-
trast, the increase has been quite substantial among respondents with
either some college or a college degree, with further increases among
respondents with post-graduate education—perhaps limited somewhat
by their already very high levels of sophistication. Thus, the relationship
between education and higher levels of conceptualization has become
stronger over the years, with the educationally advanced increasingly
picking up on ideological and policy arguments.
Figure . Pct. concept ideologues and policy ideologues, by education
level
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICPSR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained from William Jacoby, as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset.




Some of the political concepts that more highly educated people are likely
to have been picking up in recent decades are the increasingly clear ideo-
logical and policy positions coming from party elites. The two major
parties have become far more ideologically coherent at the elite level, as
documented by numerous studies of congressional voting patterns and
party platforms (e.g., Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz ; Theriault
). Other studies have conﬁrmed that increasing numbers of voters
are matching their partisan identity to their ideology with greater fre-
quency, but not nearly at the same level as are political elites (Hethering-
ton  and ). If concept ideologues and policy ideologues tend to
be relatively keyed in to political debates, the nexus between party and
ideology should be especially strong among them.
Figure  demonstrates that the correlation between party identiﬁ-
cation and placement on the -point ideology scale is indeed much
stronger for concept ideologues and policy ideologues than for those
in Converse’s other levels of conceptualization. In the -
data, the shared variance for ideologues and policy ideologues is over
 percent among these two groups of respondents, but it does not
exceed  percent for any of the other groups. Voters at all levels of
conceptualization show some evidence of an increase in the party-ideol-
ogy connection, but this trend is especially pronounced among concept
and policy ideologues.
The strengthening nexus between party and ideology seems to consist
of two related but separate processes. Respondents increasingly choose an
ideology that matches their party; they also become less likely to claim an
ideological label that is sharply out of step with their party. These two
processes are akin to what Alan Abramowitz () calls “ideological
matching” and Morris P. Fiorina () terms “ideological sorting.” It
is relatively difﬁcult to match party and ideology correctly, but relatively
easy to avoid an obviously incorrect pairing. Thus, the matching of
Republicans to conservatism and Democrats to liberalism represents a
relatively sophisticated level of thinking that might increasingly be
found among those who think like concept and policy ideologues,
while the decline of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans
may represent a set of choices that requires much less conceptualization,
and thus should be found among all levels of conceptualization.
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As hypothesized, Figure  demonstrates that concept and policy ideo-
logues have always harbored the highest percentage of ideologically con-
sistent partisans (conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats). This
has been even more evident in recent years. All told, concept and
policy ideologues accounted for  percent of conservative Republicans
or liberal Democrats in - as compared to just  percent in
 and  percent in the s. The vast majority of the rise in the
matching of party and ideology has occurred because of the growth in
the number of concept and policy ideologues, who seem better able to
link their ideological position to their party identiﬁcation.
The patterns for ideologically inconsistent partisans (liberal Republi-
cans and conservative Democrats) are quite different, as shown in
Figure . Whereas consistency between party and ideology clearly
increases as one moves up the levels of conceptualization, inconsistency
is (at present) much more evenly distributed. Unlike the case with
Figure . Correlation between party identiﬁcation and ideological self-
placement
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICPSR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained from William Jacoby, as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset.
-: author’s coding of ANES open-ended responses and merged with
ANES datasets.
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ideologically consistent partisans, the percentage of concept and policy
ideologues among those whose party conﬂicts with their ideology has
not changed over time, ranging from  percent in the s to 
percent in  and  percent in -. It is worth noting that the rela-
tively large number of mismatches among policy ideologues in the s
occurred among conservative Democrats in the South who had not yet
found a home in the Republican party—and who, it might be said,
were not actually mismatched, given the conservatism of the Democratic
Party in the South of that era.
The Shrinking Conceptualization Gap between the Parties
The data on the party-ideology nexus reﬂects a pattern that has been often
noted in recent years: that Republicans are more likely to be ideologically
and policy inclined than Democrats (Grossman and Hopkins ).
Figure  demonstrates that Republican voters were much more likely
than Democratic voters to be either concept or policy ideologues in
Figure . Matches in partisan and ideological self-identiﬁcation
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICPSR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained from William Jacoby, as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset.
-: author’s coding of ANES open-ended responses and merged with
ANES datasets.
Wattenberg • Concept and Policy Ideologues 
most years for which data are available. However, the stunning insurgency
campaigns of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in  seemed to bring
the parties closer together in terms of conceptualization, with the Repub-
licans becoming less ideologically oriented and the Democrats more so.
Trump was a far less ideological (conservative) ﬁgure than had been
any Republican nominee in the previous  years. Although he could
talk a good game regarding some conservative policies, on issues like
foreign trade his stand sharply contradicted traditional conservative
free-market dogma. Furthermore, his appeal was more rooted in iden-
tity politics than the Republican Party had ever seen before (Sides,
Tesler, and Vavreck ). In , there was little difference in the
levels of conceptualization of voters who supported Romney in the pri-
maries and those who supported another Republican. By contrast,
Trump primary voters were over  percent less likely to be concept
or policy ideologues than were those who supported a more traditional
Republican candidate for the presidency. At the same time that Donald
Trump was moving the Republicans away from its recent emphasis on
Figure . Mismatches in partisan and ideological self-identiﬁcation
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICSPR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained from William Jacoby, as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset.
-: author’s coding of ANES open-ended responses and merged with
ANES datasets.
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ideology, Bernie Sanders appears to have led some Democrats away
from their usual group-based way of thinking towards ideological
purity. Far more than most Democratic presidential contenders, he
emphasized ideological concepts (progressivism and democratic social-
ism) as well as policies. Voters who supported Sanders in the  pri-
maries were nearly twice as likely as those who voted for Hillary
Clinton to be concept or policy ideologues.
The implications of the changes in the partisan patterns found between
 and  are potentially quite great. If Democrats maintain their
newfound ideological fervor and Republicans return to their normal
level of concern with ideology and policy, then the nature of mass
belief systems will move even further in the ideologue direction.
Education and Ideology
Between the rise in the proportion of voters who can be classiﬁed as
concept ideologues and those who can be classiﬁed as policy ideologues,
Figure . Pct. concept ideologues plus policy ideologues among voters
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICSPR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained from William Jacoby, as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset.
-: author’s coding of ANES open-ended responses and merged with
ANES datasets.
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the continental shelf detected by Converse has shrunk considerably.
With the combined total of these two groups reaching  percent in
 and  percent in , the American electorate looks rather
different than it did  years earlier, in the election survey so memor-
ably analyzed by Converse. While political analysts continue to make
the mistake against which Converse tried to warn them, the mistake
is not as signiﬁcant as it once was. If the lesson of The American Voter
can be summed up as the political ignorance of the American electorate,
the lesson of this paper is that nearly half of American voters have
emerged into the realm of political “sophistication,” understood as ideo-
logical constraint. Where it used to be true that presidential elections
could not be considered ideological referenda, now, to a great extent,
they can.
This was somewhat predictable based on changes in the educational
distribution of the electorate since , but not entirely so. Figure 
shows the expected percentage of concept and policy ideologues
based on the educational distribution in each year, as compared to the
actual percentages found in the surveys I have been discussing.
Between  and , the actual observations track what one
would have expected based on educational levels. However, in the
highly polarized environment of the , , and  elections,
the actual percentage of concept and policy ideologues was substantially
higher than educational changes would have led us to expect. As elites
have polarized and political debates have become more centered on
ideology and policy, it may be that the once-“ignorant” public has
picked up more and more on the resulting cues. Still, the question of
why, or how, higher education produces greater political sophistication
deserves far more attention than it has received. It seems likely that the
relevance of this question to explaining political beliefs and voter behav-
ior will continue to grow.
Converse did not suggest that political sophistication is an unmixed
blessing. He connected sophistication to ideology and ideology not
only to greater political knowledge, but greater political conviction.
The convictions dictated by an ideology may not, however, be entirely
rational. As he wrote in “The Nature of Belief Systems,”
Whatever may be learned through the use of strict logic as a type of con-
straint, it seems obvious that few belief systems of any range at all depend
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for their constraint upon logic in this classical sense. Perhaps, with a great
deal of labor, parts of a relatively tight belief system like that fashioned by
Karl Marx could be made to resemble a structure of logical propositions. It
goes without saying, however, that many sophisticated people have been
swept away by the “iron logic” of Marxism without any such recasting.
There is a broad gulf between strict logic and the quasi-logic of cogent
argument. (Converse [] , -)
Nevertheless, Converse continued, “What is important is that the elites
familiar with the total shapes of these belief systems have experienced
them as logically constrained clusters of ideas, within which one part
necessarily follows from another” (ibid., ). No matter how illogical an
ideology is, its adherents ﬁnd it quite persuasive. Indeed, they may
confer on the ideology the status of an unquestionable truth that only vil-
lains would deny.
Figure . Expected pct. of concept ideologues and policy ideologues
among voters based on educational levels, compared to actual
observations
Sources: -: Pierce/Hagner/Knight archived datasets (ICPSR ) as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES datasets.
: coding of open-ended responses, obtained from William Jacoby, as
recoded by the author for policy ideologues and merged with ANES dataset.
-: author’s coding of ANES open-ended responses and merged with
ANES datasets.
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This may shed light on some of the comments regarding Hillary
Clinton and Donald Trump made by concept and policy ideologues in
the  ANES:
Do you know how to tell if Hillary is lying—her mouth is moving.
She is a devious person—evil.
She treats the little people like garbage.
She is very liberal, destroying the foundation on [sic] the way the US was
built on Christianity.
She’s anti-American; she should be brought up on treason.
She is a power hungry superﬁcial fake individual who only cares about
herself.
She is possibly the most corrupt and evil person to ever run for high ofﬁce
in the U.S.
I think she wants to make us communists.
He’s a threat to democracy. He’s unﬁt to lead the military, racist, xenopho-
bic, and misogynistic.
He’s a maniacal moron.
He seems completely unable to see truth from lies. I think he literally lives
in his own world.
He seems like a modern-day Hitler. His policies range from not making
sense to being outright offensive.
Depending on where you stand politically, these comments will
contain many moments of insight and good sense, but—regardless of
where you stand politically—taken as a whole, they suggest that stereo-
types about polarization, to the point of extreme interpersonal hostility,
are not without a basis in fact. Yet if nothing else, the vocabulary used
by these respondents suggests that they are far more politically sophisti-
cated than were most of the  voters analyzed by Converse.
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Whether political sophistication actually contributes to their vituperative-
ness is something else that warrants further research in a Conversean vein.
NOTES
. The one dataset that contains codes for both ideologues and near ideologues is from
the  election. Although Converse coded these categories for , as well as a
multitude of sub-categories, this coding was lost when the data were archived with
the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Much
to Converse’s dismay, he found out too late that it was ICPSR’s policy to remove
any derived variables from survey datasets. Thus, Converse’s actual coding, which
had been derived from reading the interviews, was deleted from the  dataset
made available to the scholarly community. Fortunately, he had shared his coding
with some colleagues over the years.William Flanagan at theUniversity ofMinnesota
had taken the data that Converse provided him and recoded it into four levels of con-
ceptualization (ideologues, group-beneﬁts, nature-of-the-times, no issue content) for
a small dataset that he had his students analyze. These data are the only surviving levels
of conceptualization data from  and can be found in ICPSR .
. The full coding instructions for the  study can be found in Pierce . My
best guess is that these instructions were either done for Converse’s own disser-
tation or for the use of Converse’s second coder, who coded  cases as part of
a reliability test. A copy of the full  coding instructions is available from the
author upon request.
. The transcripts of the interviews from  to  were microﬁlmed many years
ago and are stored by the ANES staff in Ann Arbor, Michigan. I had the very inter-
esting experience of reading through some of the interviews from these years for
another project.
. The codes that I counted in the ANES cumulative ﬁle were: -, -,
-, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -
, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -,
-, -, -, -, -, -, -,
-, -, -, -, -, -, -
, -, -, -, -, -, -,
-, -, -, -, -, -, -
, -, -, -, -, and -.
. The  data have not been coded for levels of conceptualization and the actual
responses are not readily available. In order to do any coding of the -
responses, one would have to journey to Ann Arbor and review all the responses
at the University of Michigan. Fortunately, starting in , the ANES has made all
the responses available for anyone to read in Excel ﬁles.
. John Pierce, who did coding of the  and other early election studies, wrote to
me on July , : “As I recall, Converse and we coded those as near-ideologues,
if the multiple issue positions seemed to hang together, even if the ideological
terms were not used.”
. As every respondent was asked the open-ended questions in the pre-election inter-
view, I can think of no explanation for the exclusion of pre-election data for
respondents who did not agree to be re-interviewed after the election. The one
principal investigator (John Pierce) whom I was able to contact regarding this
matter had no recollection of why this was done.
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. For the one election study () where data are available for Converse’s ideolo-
gues and near ideologues separately, ideologues had a mean score of only  percent
higher than near ideologues on the political knowledge index.
. There are not enough cases of policy ideologues from the s to do a reliable
analysis. Data from , , and  were never coded for ideological
conceptualization.
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